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 Fiscal support and earnings management 
 
Abstract:  It is well documented in the literature that firms tend to manipulate earnings 
before IPO (initial public offerings) and SEO (seasoned equity offerings). This study 
contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence on whether and how fiscal support 
in the form of preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy affects a firm’s earnings 
management behaviors. Using data for Chinese firms that conduct IPO and SEO, I find that 
firms have a lower level of earnings management prior to the offerings if they enjoy more 
preferential tax treatment or more financial subsidies from local governments. My results are 
consistent with the view that firms that receive stronger fiscal support have smaller demand 
for earnings management which is a costly tool for a firm to achieve its desired earnings 
targets.  
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1. Introduction 
Officially opened in the early 1990s, China’s stock exchanges were established as an 
experiment in combining a market economy with central planning. As most Chinese listed 
companies are sponsored and controlled by government-related entities, governmental 
intervention in the stock market has dominated throughout. The quotas of IPOs distributed 
from the nation are allocated by a local government to firms selected from its jurisdiction. 
The local government deemed the listed firms within its jurisdiction as a symbol of wealth 
and prestige as well as a potent tool to promote territorial economic growth (Chan et al., 
2006). While local firms finance for investments and business expansion through equity 
offerings, more foreign capital resources would be absorbed to the municipal jurisdictions for 
the local business, thereby stimulating the territorial economic development. However, the 
regulations require firms to attain a minimum rate of return on equity (ROE) to be qualified 
for rights offerings. Furthermore, investors tend to rely on earnings more than any other 
summary measures of firm performance to make their investment decisions (Biddle et al., 
1995; Francis et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2002). Therefore, to facilitate 
financing, both the local governments and their listed firms wish for a high level of corporate 
reported earnings prior to equity offerings. On the one hand, local governments compete to 
lend fiscal support (i.e., preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy) to local firms in 
support of their financing (Chen & Lee, 2001), thus inducing drastic competition for capital 
resources among the local governments.1 On the other hand, firms that desire for low 
financing costs tend to manipulate earnings to a high level.  
This paper aims to investigate whether and how fiscal support in the form of preferential 
tax treatment and financial subsidy affects a firm’s earnings management behaviors in China. 
                                                        
1 Chen and Lee (2001) provide descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the fiscal support for Chinese 
listed firms during 1997-1999. They show that in order to compete for capital resources from the capital 
market, local governments generally grant income tax preferences and financial subsidies to listed firms 
under their jurisdictions.  
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My investigation is motivated by the growing interests in the influence of political forces on 
firm activities in transitional economy such as China (e.g., Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer, 
2007; Piotroski et al., 2015; Hung et al., 2012). Fiscal support from local governments is one 
source of political forces that prevails in transitional economy yet remains unexplored by 
researchers so far. This study fills this void in the literature. Given the privatization through 
sales of government-owned enterprises and the increased opportunities for global investors 
(especially those from Europe and U.S.) to purchase shares in China’s stock market, 
understanding the role of fiscal support in a firm’s financial reporting incentive is important 
to the market participants.2 This practical implication can be generalized to other institutional 
settings where there are varied fiscal policies implemented across jurisdictions within a 
country (e.g., U.S.) or across different countries within a politico-economic union (e.g., 
European Union). 
Both earnings management and fiscal support could help a firm achieve its desired 
earnings targets. However, earnings inflated by a firm would reverse and decline in the 
subsequent periods, which induces high risks of subsequent detection and hence reputational 
loss along with litigation and regulatory actions to a firm (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; He, 
2015). Hence, earnings management is a much risky and costly tool for a firm to boost its 
reported earnings. In contrast, while substituting for earnings management in propping up 
earnings number, fiscal support brings about real cash benefits for a firm. Thus, given a firm’s 
desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support reduces the firm’s demand for earnings 
management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that firms that receive stronger fiscal support from 
local governments have a lower level of earnings management.  
                                                        
2 Many transitional economies such as China, India, and Vietnam have been privatizing their state-owned 
enterprises through either selling government-owned shares in domestic market or listing in developed 
overseas markets. The capital-raising activities of the state-owned enterprises have triggered fierce 
competition among global stock exchanges to attract new listings from Chinese firms (Kissel & Santini, 
2004), notably for the world’s biggest IPO by Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (ICBC)’s $19 
billion share issuance.   
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Equity offerings in China provide an ideal setting to test the hypothesis. The reasons are 
two-fold. First, the hypothesis is based on the premise that managers have a desire of 
achieving certain earnings targets. Chinese equity issuers generally target at a particular high 
level of reported earnings that appeal to investors, so that they can manage to raise full capital 
as planned (Aharony et al., 2000). Second, local governments in China tend to fiscally 
support local firms for their financing such that more capital resources and foreign 
investments would be attracted to their jurisdictions. As a result, Chinese firms, to varied 
extent, enjoy fiscal support from local governments during equity offerings.  
Using data for Chinese firms that conduct IPO (initial public offerings) and SEO 
(seasoned equity offerings), I find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis. In particular, 
I find that firms have a smaller magnitude of earnings management prior to equity offerings if 
they enjoy more financial subsidies or more income tax savings attributed to income tax 
preferences granted by local governments. I also find that income tax preference mitigates a 
firm’s earnings management to a larger extent than financial subsidy does. Prior research (e.g., 
Aharony et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2006; Haw et al., 2005; Liu & Lu, 2007) documents that 
Chinese listed companies mainly use accruals to manipulate earnings. Hence, I use abnormal 
accruals as the proxy for earnings management, which is estimated based on the modified 
Jones model. The results are robust to using other discretionary accruals models such as the 
one developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006). My main test treats fiscal support as 
exogenous to earnings management. However, if local governments tend to offer fiscal 
support to firms that have poor earnings performance, firms who wish for stronger fiscal 
support will lack incentives to manipulate earnings. This alternatively explains the negative 
association between fiscal support and earnings management. To address this potential self- 
selection and endogeneity problem, I use a two-stage least squares estimation procedure. The 
results of the test are similar to my main findings.  
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This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, to my knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine the impact of fiscal support on a firm’s earnings management 
behaviors. The findings suggest that institutional factors such as fiscal support that bears the 
political incentives of local governments should be accounted for in studying earnings 
management on China’s or other East Asian emerging markets in which fiscal support from 
local government prevails and government intervention into firm’s reporting practices 
predominates (e.g., Bushman et al., 2004; Gul, 2006; Leuz & Oberholzer, 2007; Piotroski et 
al., 2015; Hung et al., 2012).  
Second, Chen et al. (2008) find that local governments offer financial subsidies to help 
their local firms achieve their earnings targets for rights offerings, and compare the subsidy 
grants to one sort of “real earnings management” directed by local governments. But Chen et 
al. (2008) do not investigate how the governmental subsidy affects managerial incentives and 
firm-level activities. This is the focus of my study. I account for a broader range of fiscal 
support including income tax preference, and explore whether the fiscal support affects the 
firm-level earnings management behaviors.  
To the extent that fiscal support is a sort of government-directed “real earnings 
management”, this study contributes to the recent strand of earnings management literature 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Bhojraj et al., 2009; Jian & Wong, 2010; Zang, 2012; Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Gunny, 2010; Burnett et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2015) 
which documents a substitutive relationship between real and accrual-based earnings 
management for achieving earnings targets. In essence, these recent studies show that each of 
the real and accrual-based earnings management activity decreases with its own costs and 
increases with the costs of the other. Different from the firm-level real earnings management 
that has suboptimal business outcomes or negative economic consequences for a firm, the 
government-directed “earnings management”, the fiscal support I focus on in this study, has 
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positive real cash benefits for a firm. Hence, given a desired level of reported earnings to 
achieve, fiscal support is a robust substitutive mechanism for firm-level earnings 
management.  
Third, there is growing evidence that government intervention and political forces shape 
financial reporting incentives of firms. For instance, Bushman et al. (2004) and Leuz and 
Oberholzer (2007) document that firms which face increased government intervention have 
an incentive to reduce financial reporting transparency and tilt reported valuation to minimize 
the political costs. The political costs include an increase in tax burdens as well as a host of 
indirect tax such as tightened regulation or threat of greater government intervention into a 
firm’s business activities. Piotroski et al. (2015) provide evidence that firms are inclined to 
suppress negative financial information in view of the expected political costs from the 
governments. This strand of literature focuses on the expected political costs associated with 
given financial outcome of a firm to investigate the issue of how a firm’s financial reporting 
practice is shaped by government intervention. In contrast, my study sheds light on this issue 
from a new perspective, that is, the benefits rather than the costs of political forces to a firm, 
and sees how a firm’s financial reporting incentives are affected by fiscal support from local 
governments.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background. Section 3 develops the research hypothesis. Section 4 presents the research 
design. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
2.1. China’s tax regimes and fiscal support from local governments  
In China, the central government implements a planned quota system for IPOs under 
which a limited listing quota is assigned to the planning commission at the provincial level, 
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and then the local governments make the allocation to IPO candidates within their 
administrative region. The limited share quota assigned to each firm is usually too small to 
meet its capital need (Chen & Yuan, 2004). To enhance the firms’ capital-raising during IPO 
as well as their subsequent rights offerings, Chinese local governments compete to lend fiscal 
support to their local IPO firms or SEO firms to attract investment that is essential to the 
territorial economic growth.  
Before 2002, there were three avenues for a local government to lend fiscal support to 
firms within its jurisdiction: preferential income tax rate, income tax refund, and financial 
subsidy. The first two comprised the income tax preference a firm enjoyed. Nevertheless, 
since the policy of “first tax last refund” (i.e., income tax refund) was abolished in 2002, 
there had been only two avenues available (i.e., preferential income tax rate and financial 
subsidy) for local governments to mitigate the effective tax burden of companies in their 
administrative regions. After 2007 in which most preferential tax provisions were abrogated, 
local governments mainly resort to subsidy grants to support their listed companies. 
Preferential income tax rate policy usually serves as a tax incentive for firms located in 
special economic zones, fast-developed economic and technologic regions as well as other 
designated regions, and aims at encouraging the development of certain industries such as 
high-tech, energy, transportation, infrastructures, and agriculture industry. The firms which 
are entitled to the tax rate preference pay their income tax at a rate lower than the standard tax 
rate of 33%, varying between 27% and 0% depending on the firm attributes. The approval of 
tax rate preferences for companies is up to the discretion of local tax bureau or local office of 
SAT (State Administration of Taxation) which is an indispensable affiliated segment of a local 
government. Most Chinese local governments grant income tax rate preferences to companies 
that fail to meet the national criteria for granting preferential income tax rate (Chen & Lee, 
2001). Thus, many Chinese companies, to varied extent, manage to enjoy the benefits from 
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the preferential tax rate policy.  
Most listed companies in China were subject to the standard tax rate of 30% plus the 
local tax of 3% prior to their listing on the stock exchange. No sooner would those companies 
get listed, did they get the approval from local governments to enjoy a preferential income tax 
rate. The ensuing lower tax burden resulted in a higher level of reported earnings for the 
companies, and thereby facilitated their financing through the subsequent equity offerings. 
The 30% standard tax rate could be reduced to 27%, 15% or even 0% as a tax preference for 
firms. The specific amount of the 3% local tax to be levied from firms was arbitrarily up to 
the discretion of local governments. The local governments were prone to waive the 3% local 
tax to support local firms in their financing and investments. As such, the effective tax rates 
for most Chinese listed companies fell in the following three intervals: 15%-18%, 24%-27% 
and 30%-33%, with some of the firms enjoyed an income tax exemption. 
Before 2002, local governments could firstly levy income tax on companies at a rate of 
33% and then refunded part of the tax to the companies. Which company would be 
“qualified” for the refund and how much the refund would be paid were up to the discretion 
of local governments (Wu et al., 2007). When a local government found it hard to get a 
favorable ground to grant preferential income tax rate to a firm, they used to resort to this 
“first tax last refund” practice to relieve the tax burden of their listed companies. Local 
governments that wished to attract foreign investments in local business usually offered large 
tax refund to local companies right before the IPO to facilitate their financing (Chen & Lee, 
2001).  
Financial subsidy is another instrument for a local government to lend support to firms 
within its jurisdiction. Subsidies from local governments can be exempt from income tax, 
subject to the approval from the Chinese central government. Chinese local bureaucrats 
generally expect firms located in their jurisdictions to produce strong performance results 
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since the provincial leaders’ promotions and demotions are significantly associated with the 
economic performance of the province under their control (Li, 1998; Li & Zhou, 2005; 
Piotroski et al., 2015). Since local enterprises make up the main forces of promoting the 
territorial economy, subsidy grants to the enterprises prevail in China.3 In order to attract 
economic resources and promote territorial economic growth, local governments compete to 
grant financial subsidies to their local enterprises in support of their financing. Chen et al. 
(2008) show that Chinese local governments tend to use subsidies to help firms boost their 
reported earnings to meet the regulatory return on equity (ROE) threshold for rights offerings. 
Without the subsidies which are being recognized as revenue in the income statements, a 
number of Chinese listed firms would have failed to meet the regulatory ROE requirement for 
rights issues (Chen & Lee, 2001).  
In China, under the State Council regulations governing the tax revenue sharing regime, 
enterprise income tax levied by the local offices of SAT (State Administration of Taxation) is 
shared between central government and local governments in the ratio of 60% to 40% (Liu, 
2006). As 60 percent of the income tax levied on companies is assigned as fiscal revenues to 
central government, local governments would only suffer 40% loss in fiscal revenues for 
offering income tax preferences to their local firms. Likewise, local governments also only 
suffer partial loss of fiscal revenues for granting “first tax last refund” to the local firms. 
Compared to tax preference grant, financial subsidy grant is more costly for a local 
government as the full amount of subsidies granted to firms is borne by the local government. 
So, the income tax preference grant becomes a more common avenue for a local government 
to fiscally support its local firms than the financial subsidy grant. This helps explain why in 
                                                        
3 Territorial economic development and competitiveness, to a large extent, depend on performance of 
firms within the jurisdictions. Hence, local governments compete to afford local firms subsidies to support 
their investment and operation activities. For instance, in December, 2003, local government in Liaoning 
province, where automobile industry is the mainstay of the territorial economy, granted financial subsidies 
of 100 million RMB to a local listed firm, Songliao Automating Corporation, to support its automotive 
production. Given varied economic conditions among regions, the incentive scheme of fiscal subsidies for 
local firms differs among local governments at the provincial level. 
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China, enterprises that enjoy income tax preferences from local governments are far more 
than enterprises that enjoy financial subsidies (Chen & Lee, 2001).4  
 
2.2. Earnings management by Chinese companies 
Prior empirical evidence indicates that investors rely on earnings more than any other 
measures of firm performance to assess firm value (Biddle et al., 1995; Liu et al., 2002; 
Francis et al., 2003). Survey results also indicate that managers view earnings as the key 
metric for performance evaluation by investors and analysts (Graham et al., 2005). Thus, in 
order to sell the shares at a higher price and raise capital at a lower cost, U.S. firms tend to 
manipulate earnings prior to equity offerings (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b). This 
motivation behind the earnings management in U.S. firms also applies to Chinese firms that 
plan on equity offerings (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007). However, the motives 
for earnings management of Chinese firms differ from those of U.S. firms in two aspects.  
First, unlike agency conflict between shareholders and managers that explains earnings 
management in most of the U.S. companies, agency conflict between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders accounts for a significant portion of earnings management for 
Chinese companies (Liu & Lu, 2007). In China, controlling shareholders tend to plunder the 
wealth of minority shareholders or that of prospective outside investors (Claessens et al., 
2000; La Porta et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Ding et al., 2007), and manage earnings to 
conceal their private control benefits from the public (Haw et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003). 
The incentives of large shareholders to manipulate earnings for the wealth expropriation are 
especially conspicuous in the setting of equity offerings among Chinese firms (e.g., Jian & 
Wong, 2010; Liu & Lu, 2007). 
Second, unlike U.S. listed companies, Chinese listed companies must meet certain 
                                                        
4 Chen and Lee (2001) show that only less than 5% of Chinese listed firms during 1997-1999 have no 
income tax preference while firms that enjoy financial subsidies from local governments account for 
20.19% in 1997, 49.41% in 1998, and 54.66% in 1999.  
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financial performance criteria to be qualified for seasoned equity offerings. From 1996 to 
1998, one of the basic requirements from China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(hereafters, CSRC) was that companies had to have a minimum of 10% ROE for the three 
consecutive years prior to rights offerings (CSRC, 1996). In 1999, the rule was modified to 
requiring an average ROE of at least 10% as well as a minimum 6% in each of the 3 years 
prior to the offerings (CSRC, 1999). From 2001 onwards, CSRC relaxed the restriction to a 
minimum 6% ROE for each of the 3 years before the offerings (CSRC, 2001). This regulatory 
requirement incentivizes Chinese firms to inflate earnings to meet the ROE benchmark prior 
to rights offerings. Consistent with this notion, Chen and Yuan (2004), Haw et al. (2005), and 
Liu and Lu (2007) all find that the Chinese listed firms tend to manipulate earnings to meet 
the ROE requirements in order to qualify for SEO.5  
 
3. Hypothesis development 
Prior research (e.g., Shivakumar, 2000) shows that financing at a low cost is one of the 
major motives for earnings manipulation. However, investors place less value on the earnings 
that are suspected of manipulation by a firm. Companies being identified as earnings 
manipulators will be subject to a substantial increase in their costs of capital. Shivakumar 
(2000) provides evidence that investors rationally infer earnings management at the offerings 
announcements and correct the price accordingly. Haw et al. (2005) find that in China, 
investors are able to see through the managed earnings and to rationally adjust it in their 
investment decisions during rights offerings. DeFond and Park (2001) focus on the general 
setting and provide evidence that market participants could anticipate the reversal implication 
of abnormal accruals. Thus, once a firm’s earnings management is undone by outside 
investors at equity offerings announcements, the firm might either fail to raise full capital as 
                                                        
5 There is no explicit minimum ROE requirement for a Chinese firm being qualify for IPO, but earnings is 
the key determinant of offer price. Thus, Chinese firms generally have an incentive to manipulate earnings 
to inflate offer price before IPO. 
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planned or be subject to price discount by external investors early around the equity offerings 
dates.  
    Even if, using earnings manipulation, a firm might manage to deceive the outside 
stakeholders at the offerings announcements, the firm would still bear high risks of 
subsequent detection. Earnings management is just like borrowing future earnings for current 
use and thus would reverse and decline in the subsequent periods. Prior studies (e.g., Teoh et 
al., 1998a, 1998c) provide evidence that earnings management prior to equity offerings is 
responsible for poor earnings performance after the offerings. This earnings reversal leads 
outside investors to suspect that earnings have been managed upwards before the equity 
offerings (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2008). Accordingly, investors adjust for their earlier 
mispricing and further impose price discount on firms for their earnings manipulation. 
Consistent with this notion, prior research (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a) documents 
that pre-offerings earnings management explains the long-term stock underperformance after 
equity offerings. The subsequent detection of earnings management results in reputational 
loss for a firm and hence increases its costs of capital and impairs its capability of future 
financing (He, 2015).  
    Earnings management also increases a firm’s litigation risks. Firms might suffer from 
lawsuits and regulatory actions for their earnings management and hence bear the litigation 
costs. Ducharme et al. (2004) find that abnormal accruals are particularly high for SEO firms 
that are subsequently sued, and the settlement amounts are positively associated with the 
level of abnormal accruals. Their evidence implies that the earnings management drives the 
post-SEO litigation. Also, Billings & Lewis-Western (2015) find that aggressive pre-IPO 
financial reporting triggers legal consequences. Similar to SEC in U.S, CSRC in China 
regularly carries out investigation to identify and prosecute financial frauds among equity 
issuers. Any regulatory enforcement action taken against a firm that engages in fraudulent 
  12                                                                                 
financial reporting would have negative economic consequences for the firm. Chen et al. 
(2005) provide evidence that firms that are subject to CSRC enforcement actions experience 
a drastic decline in stock price, a greater rate of auditor change, a much higher incidence of 
qualified audit opinions, increased CEO turnover, and wider bid-ask spreads.  
    In sum, earnings management is a risky and costly instrument for a firm to boost its 
reported earnings. In contrast, fiscal support per se not only is costless for a firm but also 
increases the firm’s real cash flows. Recent literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 
2012; Chan et al., 2015) documents that firms tend to use multiple earnings management 
tools as substitutes to achieve their desired earnings targets. These studies show that when 
discretion is more (less) costly for one earnings management tool, firms will make more (less) 
use of others. In the similar vein, while substituting for earnings management to boost the 
reported earnings, fiscal support adds real cash benefits to a firm. As such, given a firm’s 
desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support should reduce the firm’s demand for 
earnings management. This argument is in line with the incentive theory (e.g., Kerr, 1995) 
which contends that one would be less likely to commit malpractice to reap its private 
benefits if it is given an economic incentive. Fiscal support is one such incentive which 
reduces the likelihood that firms venture upon earnings manipulation to achieve their 
earnings targets. The discussion above leads to the hypothesis formulated in an alternative 
form as follows. 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms that obtain stronger fiscal support from local governments have 
a smaller magnitude of earnings management. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1. Sample selection 
The data are obtained from both the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
  13                                                                                 
(CSMAR) database and the Wind database. Panel A of Table 1 describes the sample selection 
procedure. The sample selection starts with the entire population of both IPO firms and SEO 
firms on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges over 1997-2006. The new Chinese 
Enterprise Income Tax Law promulgated in March 2007 abrogated the original tax regime 
that allowed varied income tax rates applicable for different types of firms, and stipulated a 
25% enterprise income tax rate applied to almost all firms in China from 1 January 2008 
onwards. As such, in 2007 when the new income tax law was promulgated, firms that had an 
income tax rate above 25% under the old tax regime would have an incentive to manage 
earnings downwards in 2007. In this way, the firms could reduce income tax expenditure by 
reserving more earnings to be recognized after 2008 when they would enjoy the lower level 
of income tax rate (i.e., 25%) under the new tax regime. In a similar vein, firms that were 
subject to an income tax rate below 25% under the old tax regime had an incentive to manage 
earning upwards to take advantage of the lower tax rate that was still available in 2007. Since 
the earnings management in 2007 enables firms to minimize tax costs, I expect it to prevail 
among Chinese firms in 2007. This would cause confounding effects to my results if firms in 
2007 are included in my sample. Hence the sample period ends in 2006. 
Following the sample selection method proposed by Rangan (1998), if listed companies 
have equity offerings more than once within any three years during the sample period, I 
choose only the earliest equity offering to trim measurement errors arising from the iterative 
offerings. Financial institutions are removed since the financial variables for financial 
institutions are not comparable to those for non-financial firms. I further eliminate firms 
whose listing had been postponed and firms that lack industry information from the databases. 
The final sample consists of 3290 firm-year observations for the selected firms that have 
complete financial information during the three years prior to the year of equity offerings.6 
                                                        
6 I focus on the three-year pre-offerings period for my sampling because firms that conduct equity 
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Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the final sample across fiscal years and 
industries.7  
 
4.2. Variable measures 
4.2.1. Earnings management  
 While I use different models of abnormal accruals in my sensitivity tests, the main tests 
are based on the following cross-sectional version of the industry-specific modified-Jones 
model (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Hunt et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000).  
, , 1 0 1 , 1 2 , , , 1 3 , , 1 ,/ (1/ ) ( ) / ( / )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tTA A A REV REC A PPE A                      (1) 
Where TAi,t is total accruals for firm i in fiscal year t;
8 REVi,t is change in revenues for firm 
i in fiscal year t; Ai,t-1 is total assets for firm i at the end of fiscal year t-1; RECi,t is change in 
accounts receivable for firm i at the end of fiscal year t. The model assumes that no 
systematic earnings management occurs for the cross-sectional estimation sample. So I 
exclude the IPO and SEO firm-year observations when using model (1) to do the cross- 
sectional parameter estimates. The parameter estimation incorporates a constant term 0 since 
doing so mitigates the model misspecification problem (Kothari et al., 2005). Abnormal 
accruals (DA) for firm i in fiscal year t are measured by the residual value from the model.  
There has been growing evidence (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 
2015) of how firms manage earnings through real activities manipulation in addition to 
accruals-based method. For instance, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) provide evidence that SEO 
firms in U.S. engage in real earnings management in addition to accruals-based earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                            
offerings are required to publicly disclose their financial performance for the most recent three years prior 
to the offerings.  
7 I use the industry classification provided by CSRC which classifies firms into 13 major industries such 
as manufacturing, real estate, commercial, etc. 
8 For post-1998 data, TA is computed as the difference between operating net income and operating cash 
flows. For other years when cash flow statement data are not available, I compute TA as: (change in current 
assets – change in cash – change in short-term lending) – (change in current liabilities – change in short- 
term borrowings – change in accrued income taxes – change in current portion of long-term debts) – 
depreciation expense – amortization expense, where the change is computed between year t and t-1. 
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management prior to the offerings. Following Roychodhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), I calculate real earnings management through three metrics, abnormal cash flows 
from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs, for my 
sample firms. In results not reported, however, I do not find significant positive abnormal 
production costs, negative abnormal discretionary expenses, or negative abnormal cash flows 
from operations prior to equity offerings. This suggests that equity issuers in China do not 
engage in real earnings management which is more costly for a firm than accruals-based 
earnings management. Though real earnings management is less likely to be scrutinized and 
detected by outsiders (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010), the Chinese issuers 
still rely primarily on accruals-based method probably in the belief that they could still fool 
some less sophisticated investors who are not capable of undoing the accruals manipulation. 
A statistically significant variance of real earnings management (relative to 0) for the sample 
is requisite for the empirical analysis of the substitutive relationship between real earnings 
management and fiscal support. Hence, I do not account for real earnings management in this 
study. 
 
4.2.2. Fiscal support variables 
Fiscal support from local governments includes preferential income tax rate, income tax 
refund, and financial subsidy. For companies having preferential income tax rate, their 
income tax expense is reduced. So I estimate a firm’s income tax savings attributed to 
preferential income tax rate as the difference between the standard income tax expense (i.e., 
33% of pre-tax income) and the actual income tax expense. Total amount of income tax 
savings equals income tax refund plus income tax savings ascribed to preferential income tax 
rate. Income tax savings rate (TAXSAV) is then calculated as total amount of the income tax 
savings deflated by net income, which reflects the extent to which income tax preference 
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contributes to boosting a firm’s reported earnings.9 Financial subsidy is derived from the 
account of “subsidy income” in a firm’s income statement. The subsidy rate (SI), calculated 
as subsidy income divided by net income, is used to measure the extent to which a firm 
benefits from financial subsidies in achieving its earnings performance.  
 
4.3. Multivariate regression analysis 
The following pooled OLS regression model is conducted to test H1. 
 0 1 1 2 3 4 5
6 ( ) ( )
DA TFI MKT LEV SIZE EXP ROA
ROA year fixed effects region fixed effects
      
 
      
    
                 (2) 
The dependent variable, DA, is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry- 
specific modified Jones model with IPO and SEO observations deleted in the cross-sectional 
estimation of normal accruals.10 TFI is defined as the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and tax 
savings rate (TAXSAV), where SI equals subsidy income divided by net income for a firm 
over a fiscal year, and TAXSAV equals 33% of pre-tax income minus income tax expense and 
plus tax refund, deflated by net income for a firm over a fiscal year.11 
I control for several firm characteristics that prior studies find to be related to the 
magnitude of earnings management. These firm characteristics include financial leverage 
(LEV) (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002), firm size (SIZE) (e.g., Haw et al., 
2004), market-to-book ratio (MKT) (e.g., Young, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Kothari et al., 
2005), and capital intensity (EXP) (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 1997; Young, 1999; Klein, 2002), 
                                                        
9 Observations are eliminated if net income is equal to zero or negative. 
10 The IPO and SEO observations deleted include those that have IPOs or SEOs either at the current fiscal 
year or in the future two fiscal years.  
11  In China, either non-tax-deductible expense item or tax-exempt income item generates book-tax 
difference for a firm. So a firm needs to adjust its pre-tax income upwards by the non-tax-deductible 
expense and downwards by the tax-exempt income to obtain its taxable income number. However, on the 
one hand, expense not necessarily incurred to generate revenue is treated by China’s enterprise income tax 
law as non-tax-deductible expense. In this sense, the non-tax-deductible expense should not constitute a 
source of income tax savings attributed to income tax preference. On the other hand, the tax exemptions 
for some income items such as interest income from state-issuing bonds constitute a source of income tax 
savings attributed to income tax preference for a firm. Therefore, I use 33% of pre-tax income rather than 
33% of taxable income as the benchmark to estimate TAXSAV.  
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which are defined in the appendix. I also control for year and region fixed effects since the 
incentive schemes of fiscal support vary among local governments at provincial level and 
differ across fiscal years (Chen & Lee, 2001). I do not account for corporate governance 
characteristics in the regression because corporate governance data for most of the Chinese 
IPO and SEO firms prior to their offerings are not available.12 Last, I cluster the standard 
errors by industry to correct for the industry effects (e.g., Williams, 2000; Petersen, 2009).13 
    The estimated abnormal accruals for IPO and SEO firms contain abnormal accruals 
purely correlated with performance, in addition to the accruals related to equity offerings. To 
alleviate the concern that the modified Jones model provides biased estimates of abnormal 
accruals when firms experience extreme earnings performance (Dechow et al., 1995), I 
further include two earnings performance-related variables, operating return on assets (ROA) 
and absolute value of change in operating return on assets (∆ROA), in the regression. These 
two control variables purge the earnings management measure of a firm’s inherent accruals, 
reversal of lagged-year accruals, and growth in earnings, thus reducing measurement errors 
(e.g., Kasznik, 1999; Frankel et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; McNichols, 2000; Haw et al., 2004).  
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that a performance-matched accruals measure mitigates type 
I errors. Nevertheless, I do not use this approach in this study for three reasons. First, due to 
the limited sample size, there exists a great value discrepancy between ROA of the treatment 
firm-years and ROA of the matched firm-years. Thus, just as with Haw et al. (2005), I am 
unable to form a meaningful performance-matched sample within industry-years for the 
Chinese equity offerings firms. Second, the performance-matching approach’s superiority of 
                                                        
12 Around 80% of the IPO and SEO firm-years in my sample do not have corporate governance 
information. Thus, controlling for corporate governance would have substantially reduced the power of the 
tests.  
13 When robust standard errors clustered by industry are applied to correct for the industry effects, the firm 
effects are also addressed given that a firm’s industry affiliation does not vary across periods. I do not 
include industry dummies in the regression to correct for the industry effects because, in case of industry 
effect not fixed, the dummies would not fully capture the within-industry dependence and hence the 
standard errors are still biased downwards (Petersen, 2009). Still, I obtain almost identical results if I 
include industry dummies in the regression and then cluster the standard errors by firm.  
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addressing biased estimates of abnormal accruals of a firm with extreme earnings 
performance lies in the assumption that, on average, treatment sample and matched firms 
have the same estimated non-event abnormal accruals and that, at the portfolio level, the 
impact of performance on accruals should be identical for the treatment and matched sample 
(Kothari et al., 2005). Nonetheless, the homogeneity in the relation between accruals and 
performance for treatment firms and matched firms is not always warranted. Third, a recent 
study by Keung and Shih (2014) finds that the performance-matching approach 
systematically underestimates the abnormal accruals and that using the performance-matched 
abnormal accruals for regression analyses will bias the regression coefficients towards zero.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables used for the hypothesis tests. 
The average abnormal accruals are significantly above zero, so are all the quartiles including 
the median of abnormal accruals. This implies that equity issuers tend to manage reported 
earnings by altering discretionary accruals prior to the offerings, which is consistent with 
prior research. The mean subsidy rate is 4.6% with a standard deviation of 19.8%, indicating 
that an average of 4.6% of net income stems from financial subsidies from local governments. 
The mean income tax savings rate reaches 17.1%. This suggests that income tax preference is 
generally more significant in upgrading a firm’s earnings performance than financial subsidy. 
The mean TFI amounts to 21.7%, suggesting that an average of 21.7% of net income of the 
sample firms is ascribed to fiscal support from local governments. In addition, it can be 
inferred from the quartiles that income tax preference grant is more prevalent than financial 
subsidy grant for equity issuers in China. Table 3 reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations 
among the variables used in regression model (2). The correlation coefficients are all below 
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0.50, suggesting that no significant multicollinearity problem exists for model (2).  
 
5.2. Regression results 
5.2.1. Test of H1: The effect of fiscal support on earnings management 
Table 4 presents the results for the test of H1. The coefficient on TFI is negative and 
highly significant at the 1% level, which supports H1 that fiscal support reduces earnings 
management. Consistent with prior studies, the coefficients on the control variables, LEV, 
MKT, SIZE, EXP, ROA, and ∆ROA, are all statistically significant in the expected sign. This 
indicates that firms with higher financial leverage, higher market-to-book ratio, smaller size, 
less capital expenditure, or stronger earnings performance have higher abnormal accruals. 
The results are robust to winsorizing the observations with extreme variable values (1% at 
both tails) and to excluding the outliers from the sample using Cook’s (1977) distance 
statistics. 
 
5.2.2. The differential effects of income tax preference and financial subsidy on earnings 
management 
Fiscal support can be classified into the categories of preferential tax treatment and 
financial subsidy on account of their distinct attributes. The distinction is three-fold. First, as 
noted in Section 2.1, income tax preference grant is less costly for local governments than 
financial subsidy grant. Second, income tax preference barely changes across fiscal periods 
once granted to a firm by a local government, whereas the scheme of financial subsidy grant 
can vary to a large extent across fiscal years. In this sense, preferential tax treatment serves 
more of a relatively stable and long-term economic incentive to a firm compared to subsidy 
grant that varies across fiscal years. Third, unlike preferential tax treatment, financial subsidy 
grant is virtually not regulated by any law or regulation in China. When and how much 
  20                                                                                 
financial subsidies would be granted to firms are arbitrarily at the discretion of local 
governments. Thus, compared to preferential tax treatment, subsidy grant is a more flexible 
instrument for local governments to help boost reported earnings of the IPO and SEO firms 
across fiscal periods. To test the differential effects of income tax preference and financial 
subsidy on earnings management, I employ a pooled OLS regression for model (2), where 
TFI is replaced with SI and TAXSAV. 
Table 5 presents the regression results. The coefficients on financial subsidy rate (SI) 
and on tax savings rate (TAXSAV) are both negative and significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that firms are less likely to engage in earnings management if they enjoy more 
income tax savings attributed to preferential income tax treatments or enjoy more financial 
subsidies from local governments. The absolute value of the beta coefficient for tax savings 
rate (TAXSAV) is significantly larger than that for subsidy rate (SI) (F-stat.=3.53), indicating 
that the income tax preference’s attenuating impact on earnings management is stronger than 
that of financial subsidy. This is probably because preferential tax treatment is more of a 
stable and long-run economic incentive to a firm compared to subsidy grant that varies across 
fiscal years, thus making the firm less motivated to manage earnings to window-dress its 
performance. 
Corporate income tax preference takes the form of tax refund and preferential income 
tax rate. To further probe the effect of preferential income tax rate on earnings management, I 
deduct the tax refund from the total tax savings to construct the preferential income tax rate 
variable, with which I replace TAXSAV to re-run the regression.14 The results (not tabulated) 
suggest that preferential income tax rate alone significantly reduces earnings manipulation 
activities of a firm prior to its equity offerings.  
 
                                                        
14 Firms that have tax refund only account for a very small percentage in my sample (46 out of 3290 firm- 
years). So it is hard to test the effect of tax refund on earnings management in this study.  
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5.2.3. Separate IPO firms from SEO firms for test of H1 
Since the motivation for earnings management of IPO firms likely differs from that of 
SEO firms (Teoh et al., 1998a; Haw et al., 2005), I partition my sample into IPO firm-years 
and SEO firm-years for the hypothesis test. When testing H1 using the SEO sub-sample, I 
include the absolute difference between pre-subsidy ROE and regulatory ROE threshold 
(DistanceROE) to control for a firm’s potential incentives for meeting the ROE threshold for 
rights offerings. Table 6 reports the regression results based on the partitioned samples. The 
coefficients on TFI, TAXSAV, and SI for both the IPO and SEO subsamples are all negative 
and statistically significant, which supports H1.  
 
5.3. Robustness check 
5.3.1. Alternative measure of income tax savings attributed to preferential tax treatment 
To highlight the income tax savings reflected on current tax liabilities, I exclude deferred 
tax from income tax expense, and employ an alternative measure of income tax savings as 
follows: 33%* [net income + (income tax expense – deferred income tax)] – (income tax 
expense – deferred income tax) + tax refund, namely, TAXSAV. I repeat my regression 
analysis using TAXSAV. The results (available upon request) are similar in all respects to 
those reported in Table 5.  
 
5.3.2. Alternative measures of earnings management 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the conventional linear accruals models (e.g., the 
modified Jones model), which ignore the roles of accruals in timely loss recognition, 
misspecify the accounting accruals process and misestimate the abnormal and normal 
components of accruals. They find that piecewise-linear regression which incorporates the 
asymmetric gain and loss recognition role of accruals substantially increases the explanatory 
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power of accruals model. Following the abnormal accruals model developed by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006), I use both book-based and market-return-based proxies for gain and loss 
to construct the piecewise-linear regression estimates for an alternative measure of abnormal 
accruals. I re-run model (2) using this alternative specification of abnormal accruals. The 
results (available upon request) are similar to those reported in Table 4 and 5. Adjusted R2 
increases to around 42%, confirming that the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) accruals model is 
superior over the traditional modified Jones model in capturing earnings management.  
 
5.3.3. Correct for endogeneity using 2SLS model 
Thus far, I assume that fiscal support is exogenous to firm-level decisions and activities. 
However, in the context of equity offerings during which local governments desire for as 
much capital inflows to their jurisdictions as possible, their decisions on whether and how to 
subsidize SEO firms or IPO firms might vary across years depending on a firm’s financial 
performance. If local governments tend to lend fiscal support to firms that have poor earnings 
performance, firms that wish to obtain fiscal support from local governments would lack 
incentives to manipulate earnings. Thus, reverse causality and self-selection issues arise in 
the way that lesser extent of earnings management results in stronger fiscal support from 
local governments. Or rather, in case that less earnings management is motivated by a firm’s 
desire to obtain stronger fiscal support from local governments, we could also find a negative 
association between earnings management and fiscal support.  
However, this endogeneity concern is likely minimal because my multivariate tests are 
based on a contemporaneous relation between fiscal support and earnings management. Note 
that fiscal support granted on any date during a fiscal year would be reported in a firm’s 
financial statements for this fiscal year, which is captured by my fiscal support measure at the 
end of this fiscal year. After the fiscal year-end but before the earnings announcement date, 
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managers can still artificially adjust accruals by changing the accounting estimates or 
methods, which can still be captured by the DA measure for this fiscal year-end (Zang, 2012). 
In this regard, firms can engage in earnings management (to adjust their current year’s ROA) 
in response to the fiscal support they receive from local governments during the year. 
However, by the time local governments provide their firms with fiscal support, the local 
governments cannot anticipate the coming earnings management activities and final reported 
earnings of the firms. In this connection, fiscal support event is exogenous to earnings 
management of a firm. 
Still, it is possible that both fiscal support (TFI) and earnings management (DA) are 
endogenously determined by some unobservable firm characteristics, which biases the 
coefficient estimates in model (2). To address this potential endogeneity problem, I employ a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. Two instruments are used. The first is 
GDP of a region (divided by national GDP) for a fiscal year, which is an inverse measure of 
the budget tightness of a local government. A wealthier local government characterized by 
higher territorial GDP is less likely to face budget constraints and hence likely more generous 
in affording fiscal support to local firms. On the contrary, firms would be less likely to 
receive fiscal support if their local governments face budget constraints in that fiscal year. 
However, the budget tightness of local governments is unlikely to directly affect a firm’s 
earnings management, making it a valid instrument for the 2SLS estimates. The second 
instrument is the industry median of pre-subsidy ROA in a firm’s region for a fiscal year 
(INDSUBSI). It satisfies the conditions for a valid instrument for two reasons. First, if 
industrial financial performance in a region is already strong for a fiscal year, firms within the 
industry would be less likely to further receive fiscal support from their local governments. 
Second, it is less likely that a firm whose financial performance falls short of its industry- 
level would inflate earnings to chase the industry benchmark because earnings inflated by the 
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firm would reverse and fall back to its original level in the subsequent periods. Hence, 
INDSUBSI affects fiscal support decisions but has little direct impact on the firm-level 
earnings management activities.  
Table 7 presents the results for the two-stage least squares regressions, where the 
endogenous variables, TFI, SI, and TAXSAV, are instrumented respectively. The Basmann 
statistics of the over-identifying restriction test for TFI (2 =1.0125, p=0.314), SI (2 =0.9272, 
p=0.336), and TAXSAV (2 =1.1756, p=0.278) models are all statistically insignificant, which 
implies that the instruments (i.e., GDP and INDSUBSI) I construct are exogenous and 
uncorrelated with the error terms. The partial F-statistics are all well above the cutoff point of 
11.59 and statistically significant at the 1% level, further supporting that the models are not 
subject to weak instrument problems (Stock et al., 2002; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010).15 In the 
first-stage estimation, INDSUBSI takes on a negative and significant coefficient, consistent 
with the notion that firms whose industrial financial performance in the region is strong 
would less likely be fiscally supported by their local governments. A significantly positive 
coefficient on ROA implies that local governments tend to fiscally support firms that have a 
good earnings performance. As there is no evidence that local governments tend to lend fiscal 
support to poor-performing firms, I refute the self-selection possibility that lack of earnings 
management activities is driven by firms’ desire for stronger fiscal support from local 
governments. The second-stage regression results show a significantly negative coefficient 
for the fitted TFI, SI, and TAXSAV, respectively. This further corroborates that the regression 
results shown in Table 4 and 5 are free from the potential endogeneity bias.  
In addition, it could be argued that firms’ close relationship with the government induces 
a mechanical, negative association between fiscal support and earnings management. On the 
                                                        
15 According to Stock et al. (2002), when there are two instrumental variables in the first-stage regression, 
the F-statistic for the instruments needs to be above 11.59 to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are weak.  
  25                                                                                 
one hand, an IPO/SEO firm that has a closer relationship with its government is more likely 
to be fiscally supported. On the other hand, a better firm-government relationship might make 
a firm more likely to be successful in IPO or SEO, and consequently, the firm is less likely to 
manipulate earnings. In an effort to rule out this alternative explanation, I do the following 
analyses. First, I control for firm-government relationship in the first and second stage of the 
2SLS model, and the results still persist. An indicator variable for whether a firm is a state- 
owned enterprise is used as the proxy for firm-government relationship, since state-owned 
enterprises tend to have a closer relationship with the government than do non-state-owned 
enterprises (e.g., Wu, 2009; Wang et al., 2008). Second, I conduct a falsification analysis. 
Specifically, I run a moderated regression analysis by interacting the government relationship 
measure with the fiscal support variable for model (2). If the alternative explanation holds, 
the negative impact of fiscal support on earnings management would be more pronounced for 
firms that have a stronger relationship with the government. Nonetheless, I fail to find such 
evidence, as indicated by a statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. These 
results are not surprising, because the alternative explanation is premised on the assumption 
that good firm-government connection is negatively associated with earnings management. 
Some prior studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007; Jian & Wong, 2010), however, 
allude to the opposite, showing that government-controlled firms tend to engage in earnings 
management and tunneling activities.   
 
5.3.4. Firm fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management 
Though the pooled OLS estimation of equation (2) yields the results consistent with H1, 
it cannot identify whether the impact of fiscal support comes from explaining variation in 
earnings management across firms (i.e., cross-sectional variation) or variation in earnings 
management within firms (i.e., time-series variation). The distinction between variation 
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across firms and variation within firms is important because theoretical and conceptual 
arguments as regards how fiscal support is related to earnings management predict that (1) 
firms with high fiscal support are less likely to manage earnings than firms with low fiscal 
support, which is a cross-sectional prediction; (2) a firm who enjoys an increase in fiscal 
support is less likely to manipulate earnings, which is a time-series prediction. Firm-fixed 
effect model serves to distinguish these two types of variations (Wooldridge, 2000).  
To determine whether within-firm variation in fiscal support explains within-firm 
variation in earnings management, I estimate a firm fixed effect model for equation (2).16 
This research design removes most of the cross-sectional variation in fiscal support and relies 
primarily on the within-firm (i.e., time-series) variation in fiscal support. If the negative 
association between fiscal support and earnings management is driven mainly by cross- 
sectional differences, then using the firm fixed effect model, we expect to find no evidence of 
a relationship between fiscal support and earnings management. On the contrary, if within- 
firm variation in fiscal support explains within-firm variation in earnings management, we 
expect to find an association between fiscal support and earnings management when 
including firm fixed effects in the regression.  
Table 8 presents the results for the firm fixed effect regression of fiscal support on 
earnings management. The relationship between financial subsidy and earnings management 
is insensitive to including firm fixed effects. In particular, the coefficient for subsidy rate (SI) 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that variation in financial subsidy 
explains not only variation in earnings management across firms, but also time-series 
variation in earnings management within a firm. However, the coefficient for tax savings rate 
(TAXSAV) is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the significant result for TAXSAV in 
Table 5 is primarily driven by the cross-sectional variation in preferential tax treatment, not 
                                                        
16 The chi2 statistic for the Hausman test (not tabulated) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that fixed-effect model is preferred over random effect model in controlling for firm-specific effects. 
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by the time-series variation. This is not surprising because unlike the scheme of financial 
subsidy grant that may vary substantially across fiscal years, income tax preference barely 
changes over time once granted to a firm by a local government. The lack of time-series 
variation in preferential tax treatment induces the statistically insignificant coefficient for 
TAXSAV estimated by the firm fixed effects model.17 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study is the first to investigate whether fiscal support has an impact on earnings 
management of a firm. Fiscal support could substitute for a firm’s earnings management in 
achieving desired earnings targets. Earnings management is costly and has negative economic 
consequences for a firm, whereas fiscal support adds up real cash benefits to a firm. Thus, 
given a firm’s desired level of reported earnings, fiscal support reduces the firm’s demand for 
earnings management. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the magnitude of earnings 
management is smaller for firms that enjoy stronger fiscal support from local governments.  
The hypothesis is predicated on the premise that firms have an incentive to achieve 
certain earnings targets. Equity offerings in China induce such incentives not only for 
managers but also for a local government who aims to help its listed firms finance for their 
investments. Thus, I focus on the equity offerings setting to test the hypothesis. The empirical 
results, based on the sample for both IPO firms and SEO firms from 1997 to 2006, are all 
statistically significant in support of the hypothesis. In particular, I find a lower level of 
earnings management activities for firms that enjoy more financial subsidies or more income 
tax savings attributed to preferential tax treatments from local governments. The results are 
robust to using alternative measures of income tax savings and of abnormal accruals. Also, 
                                                        
17 According to Wooldrige (2000), an effective fixed effect model requires that the independent variable 
display sufficient variation over time within a firm. From a technical point of view, this is because the 
time-invariant variable would be perfectly collinear with firm fixed effect components. From an economic 
point of view, this is because firm fixed-effect model is designed to study what causes the dependent 
variable to change within a given firm. A time-invariant independent variable cannot cause such a change.  
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the results are immune from bias caused by potential endogeneity between fiscal support and 
earnings management, as evidenced in the 2SLS analyses. I continue to find a negative 
association between financial subsidy and earnings management when I include firm fixed 
effects in the regression. This suggests that variation in financial subsidies explains not only 
variation in earnings management across firms, but also time-series variation in earnings 
management within a firm. 
The findings in this study imply that institutional factors in regard to fiscal support from 
local governments should be accounted for in earnings management research on China’s 
capital market in which fiscal support prevails and governmental influence on firms’ financial 
reporting incentives dominates. As fiscal support is compared to sort of government-assisted 
earnings management (Chen et al., 2008), this study complements the recent stream of 
earnings management literature (e.g., Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 
2012; Chan et al., 2015) which shows that firms tend to use real and accrual-based earnings 
managements as substitutes to achieve their desired earnings targets.  
In addition, I find that preferential tax treatment mitigates earnings management to a 
larger extent than financial subsidy does. However, the Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Law 
promulgated in March 2007 abrogated the original tax regime that allowed varied tax rates 
for different types of firms, and legally stipulated a 25% enterprise income tax rate for almost 
all firms in China. The repeal of income tax preference made local governments lose a 
powerful tool of lending fiscal support to their local listed firms. In China, offering financial 
subsidies to listed firms is more costly for local governments than granting income tax 
preferences. Funds available for local governments to grant financial subsidies to local firms 
are usually limited. So the increase in subsidy disbursements to compensate listed firms for 
the abrogated income tax preference would have been circumscribed. In this scenario, given a 
desired earnings target to achieve, firms might reinforce their earnings management activities. 
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Future research may empirically examine whether earnings management of Chinese listed 
firms would be aggravated after the enforcement of the new Enterprise Income Tax Law. The 
main challenge of the research is the controls for other concurrent regulatory or 
macroeconomic events around 2007 (e.g., financial crisis) which would cause severe 
confounding effects to the empirical tests. A potential solution to the problem could be to 
employ a difference-in-difference research methodology and identify a set of control firms 
that are not subject to the regulatory effect of the new income tax law. Nevertheless, we are 
unable to find such control firm sample since the new tax law is applied to almost all public 
and private firms in China.  
Lastly, some caveats need to be noted for this paper. First, as with prior research (e.g., 
Wu & Zhang, 2009; Beatty et al., 2013), this study is subject to endogeneity attributed to 
potential omitted variables. Despite efforts in addressing the endogeneity, I cannot completely 
eliminate it. Second, like some prior studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Liu & Lu, 2007; Jian 
& Wong, 2010), I focus on Chinese firms that successfully conduct IPO and SEO. It would be 
interesting to account for firms that failed in conducting IPO or SEO. Due to the data limits, I 
leave this issue as an avenue for future research. 
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Table 1  
Sample selection and distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure         n 
Total number of firms that conduct equity offerings from 1997 to 2006 1838 
 Less: firms that have iterative rights offerings within three years during the sample period 385 
 Less: financial institutions with equity offerings 18 
 Less: firms whose listing had been postponed  24 
 Less: firms that lack the industry information in the databases 10 
Selected equity issuers 1401 
Sample firm-year observations during the most recent three years prior to equity offerings by the selected equity offerings firms 4203 
Exclude firm-year observations without complete financial accounting information 913 
Final sample firm-year observations  3290 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firm-year observations across years and industries  
Industry   1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1994-2005  
Agriculture,  
Forestry and 
fishing 
2 9 13 7 14 12 4 7 9 8 4 3 92 (2.79%) 
Mining 0 2 5 5 6 4 2 4 6 4 4 4 46 (1.40%) 
Manufacture 65 233 313 232 216 195 149 139 141 121 79 67 1950(59%) 
Utilities 8 20 27 16 18 16 11 10 12 14 7 5 164 (4.98%) 
Construction 1 5 9 6 5 3 3 7 9 5 5 4 62 (1.88%) 
Transportation 5 17 22 13 20 17 13 13 10 8 6 7 151 (4.62%) 
Information  
technology 
6 25 32 18 19 20 15 21 16 9 9 9 199 (6.04%) 
Wholesale and  
retail 
16 45 50 32 21 17 10 10 9 8 4 4 226 (6.87%) 
Real estate  11 21 25 15 15 15 10 5 3 8 8 8 144 (4.37%) 
Social service 6 13 16 12 14 12 3 3 2 4 4 4 93 (2.83%) 
Communication 
and Literature 
0 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 (0.30%) 
Conglomerate 10 29 33 23 14 11 10 7 4 4 4 4 153 (4.65%) 
Total 130 421 548 381 363 324 230 226 221 193 134 119 3290 (100%) 
% of population 3.95 12.79 16.68 11.6 11.03 9.84 6.99 6.87 6.71 5.86 4.07 3.61 100 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
   
    
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regression analyses. The sample 
contains 3290 firm-year observations. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones 
model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI refers to the subsidy rate. 
TAXSAV refers to the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund for a firm. 
TFI is the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV). All the variables including DA, SI, TAXSAV, and 
TFI are defined in the appendix. 
Variable  Mean  25%  Median  75%  Std. Dev 
DA  0.011  0.029  0.008  0.015  0.012 
TFI  0.217  0.142  0.214  0.294  0.233 
SI  0.046  0  0  0.018  0.198 
TAXSAV  0.171  0.087  0.211  0.249  0.127 
MKT  2.220  0  1.473  3.122  3.371 
LEV  0.516  0.412  0.533  0.642  0.155 
SIZE  8.789  8.467  8.716  9.042  0.465 
EXP  0.105  0  0  0.165  0.189 
ROA  0.112  0.065  0.095  0.138  0.079 
∆ROA  0.037  0.009  0.022  0.045  0.035 
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Table 3 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations on the upper (lower) triangle 
 
  DA  TFI   MKT  LEV  SIZE  EXP  ROA  ∆ROA 
DA  1  -0.028   0.036**  0.013  -0.138***  -0.074***  0.160***  0.158*** 
TFI  0.009  1   0.063***  -0.082***  -0.048***  -0.095***   0.120***  0.082*** 
MKT  -0.030*  0.066***   1  -0.189***  0.074***  -0.037**  -0.069***  0.021 
LEV  0.003  -0.126***   -0.347***  1  0.116***  0.070***  -0.294***  -0.115*** 
SIZE  -0.141***  -0.042**   0.238***  0.125***  1  0.230***  -0.354***  -0.130*** 
EXP  -0.038**  -0.118***   0.084***  0.076***  0.157***  1  -0.164***  -0.082*** 
ROA  0.162***  0.235***   -0.192***  -0.324***  -0.443***  -0.186***  1  0.339*** 
∆ROA  0.136***  0.124***   -0.037**  -0.100***  -0.144***  -0.101***  0.286***  1 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the Pearson (Spearman) correlation tests. All the variables are defined in the appendix. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Test of H1: The effect of fiscal support on earnings management 
 
DA =β0+ β1 TFI + γ1MKT + γ2LEV + γ3SIZE + γ4EXP + γ5ROA + 
 γ6∆ROA + (year fixed effects) + (region fixed effects) + ε 
 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Dep.=DA 
Constant  ? 
 0.0312 
(5.07)*** 
TFI  - 
                    -0.0033 
                   (-3.05)*** 
MKT  + 
 0.0002 
(3.11)*** 
LEV  + 
 0.0058 
(4.27)*** 
SIZE  - 
 -0.0026 
(-5.38)*** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0052 
(-1.98)** 
ROA  + 
 0.0184 
(3.89)*** 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0271 
 (11.91)*** 
     
Adj. R2 (%)        6.58 
Observations    3290 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the test of H1. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the 
industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. 
TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV), where SI is the subsidy rate, and TAXSAV is 
the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. All the independent 
variables including TFI are defined in the appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but not 
reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within 
industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Test of the differential effects of preferential tax treatment and financial subsidy on 
earnings management 
 
DA =β0 +β1SI+β2TAXSAV + γ1MKT + γ2LEV + γ3SIZE + γ4EXP + γ5ROA + 
 γ6∆ROA + (year fixed effects) + (region fixed effects) + ε 
 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Dep.=DA 
Constant  ? 
 0.0316 
(5.23)*** 
SI  - 
 -0.0026 
 (-2.65)*** 
TAXSAV  - 
 -0.0055 
 (-3.22)*** 
MKT  + 
 0.0002 
 (3.38)*** 
LEV  + 
 0.0056 
 (4.27)*** 
SIZE  - 
 -0.0026 
  (-5.45)*** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0053 
 (-1.99)** 
ROA  + 
 0.0190 
 (4.13)*** 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0271 
  (11.86)*** 
     
Adj. R2 (%)        6.61 
Observations    3290 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the tests of the differential effects of preferential tax treatment and 
financial subsidy on earnings management. DA is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified 
Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. 
TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. All the 
independent variables including SI and TAXSAV are defined in the appendix. The year and region dummies are included in 
the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted 
for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  40                                                                                 
Table 6  
Test of H1: Segregation of IPO firms from SEO firms  
 
Variable  Pred. sign  SEO firms (Dep.=DA)  IPO firms (Dep.=DA) 
Constant      ? 
 0.0065 
(0.68) 
 
  0.0120 
 (1.28) 
 
0.0273 
   (3.65)*** 
 
0.0272 
  (3.81)*** 
TFI  - 
 
  
-0.0035         
(-3.21)*** 
   
-0.0033                     
(-3.02)*** 
SI  - 
 -0.0023 
   (-3.12)*** 
   
-0.0032 
   (-2.27)** 
  
TAXSAV  - 
 -0.0071 
   (-3.05)*** 
   
-0.0037 
  (-1.72)* 
  
MKT  + 
 0.0003 
  (2.25)** 
 
0.0003 
  (2.18)** 
 
0.0003 
   (3.12)*** 
 
0.0003 
   (3.10)*** 
LEV  + 
 0.0037 
   (2.87)*** 
 
0.0036 
   (2.88)*** 
 
0.0025 
(1.36) 
 
0.0026 
(1.39) 
SIZE  - 
 -0.0013 
 (-1.67)* 
 
-0.0013 
 (-1.69)* 
 
-0.0027 
   (-3.17)*** 
 
-0.0027 
   (-3.20)*** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0062 
   (-1.82)** 
 
-0.0065 
  (-1.81)* 
 
-0.0049 
 (-1.89)* 
 
-0.0049 
 (-1.86)* 
ROA  + 
 0.0074      
(0.82) 
 
0.0059 
(0.63) 
 
0.0217 
   (4.48)*** 
 
0.0216 
   (4.83)*** 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0301  
(5.45)*** 
 
0.0304  
   (5.36)*** 
 
0.0247 
   (7.51)*** 
 
0.0246 
   (7.65)*** 
DistanceROE  ? 
 0.0047  
(2.12)** 
 
0.0049  
  (2.16)** 
    
           
Adj. R2 (%)        6.25  6.18  7.85  7.91 
Observations    1741  1741  1549  1549 
 
Notes: This table presents regressions results for the tests of H1 for SEO firm-years and IPO firm-years, respectively. The 
dependent variable is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs 
deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate 
ascribed to both preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax 
savings rate (TAXSAV). All the independent variables including SI, TAXSAV, and TFI are defined in the appendix. The year and 
region dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Test of H1: Control for endogeneity 
  
Variable  
1st Stage 
TFI 
 2nd Stage 
DA 
 1st Stage 
SI 
 2nd Stage 
DA 
 1st Stage 
TAXSAV 
 2nd Stage 
DA 
Constant  
0.2645 
(2.17)*** 
 
0.0307 
(6.75)*** 
 
0.0472 
(0.49) 
 
0.0294 
(6.90)*** 
 
0.2173 
(3.18)*** 
 
0.0340 
(5.60)*** 
TFI    
-0.0071 
(-3.38)*** 
        
SI        
-0.0099 
(-3.62)*** 
    
TAXSAV            
-0.0251 
(-2.68)*** 
MKT  
0.0037 
(2.80)*** 
 
0.0003 
(3.80)*** 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.34) 
 
0.0002 
(2.92)*** 
 
0.0041 
(4.28)***  
 
0.0003 
(5.32)*** 
LEV  
-0.0455 
(-1.31) 
 
0.0056 
(4.36)*** 
 
0.0210 
(0.61) 
 
0.0062 
(4.61)*** 
 
-0.0664 
(-4.64)*** 
 
0.0043 
(3.04)*** 
SIZE  
-0.0096 
(-1.07) 
 
-0.0026 
(-5.58)*** 
 
-0.0019 
(-0.28) 
 
-0.0026 
(-5.56)*** 
 
-0.0077 
(-1.28) 
 
-0.0028 
(-5.21)*** 
EXP  
-0.0033 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.0054 
(-2.26)** 
 
0.0143 
(0.84) 
 
-0.0053 
(-2.10)** 
 
-0.0176 
(-0.87) 
 
-0.0058 
(-2.66)*** 
ROA  
4.5747 
(8.48)*** 
 
0.0195 
(4.41)*** 
 
3.0818 
(9.19)*** 
 
0.0175 
(4.02)*** 
 
1.4929 
(5.88)***  
 
0.0248 
(5.11)*** 
∆ROA  
0.0199 
(0.19) 
 
0.0278 
(11.88)*** 
 
0.0074 
(0.10) 
 
0.0278 
(11.92)*** 
 
0.0125 
(0.18)  
 
0.0280 
(11.04)*** 
INDSUBSI  
-5.8220 
(-8.42)*** 
   
-4.1907 
(-9.07)*** 
   
-1.6313 
(-5.26)*** 
  
GDP  
-0.0936 
(-0.17) 
   
0.0702 
(0.21) 
   
-0.1638 
(-0.47) 
  
             
Test of over-identifying restrictions          
Basmann 2 
(p-value) 
 
       1.0125 
(0.314) 
 
        0.9272 
   (0.336) 
 
         1.1756  
(0.278) 
       
Partial F-statistic  for instruments (p-value)     
  
91.57 
(<0.001)*** 
 
52.61 
(<0.001)*** 
 
25.71 
(<0.001)*** 
         
Adj. R2 (%)  30.22  7.46  18.72  6.35  23.39  4.37 
Observations  3290  3290  3290  3290  3290  3290 
 
Notes: This table presents the results for the two-stage least squares regression with INDSUBSI and GDP used as the 
instruments. TFI, SI, and TAXSAV are instrumented respectively as the dependent variables in the first-stage regressions. The 
dependent variable in the second-stage regression is the abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified 
Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional estimation of normal accruals. All the independent variables 
are defined in the appendix. The year and region dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. The 
t/z-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  
Firm fixed-effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management 
 
Variable  Pred. sign  Dep.=DA 
TFI  - 
 
  
-0.0023 
(-2.42)** 
SI  - 
 -0.0030 
 (-5.58)*** 
  
TAXSAV  - 
 0.0013 
(0.46) 
  
MKT  + 
 0.0002 
(2.35)** 
 
0.0002 
(2.43)** 
LEV  + 
 0.0063 
(2.11)** 
 
0.0060 
(2.20)** 
SIZE  - 
 0.0039 
(1.86)** 
 
0.036 
(1.74)** 
EXP  - 
 -0.0051 
(-1.63) 
 
-0.0050 
(-1.58) 
ROA  + 
 0.0022 
(0.39) 
 
0.0036 
(0.64) 
∆ROA  + 
 0.0173 
(2.98)*** 
 
0.0176 
(3.09)*** 
       
Within-R2 (%)        3.87  3.37 
Observations    3290  3290 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the firm fixed effect regression of fiscal support on earnings management. DA is the 
abnormal accruals estimated using the industry-specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross- 
sectional estimates of normal accruals. SI is the subsidy rate. TAXSAV is the income tax savings rate ascribed to both 
preferential income tax rate and income tax refund. TFI refers to the sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate 
(TAXSAV). All the independent variables including SI, TAXSAV, and TFI are defined in the appendix. The year dummies are 
included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The region dummies and the constant term are automatically 
differenced-out by the firm fixed effect estimates. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on clustered standard error 
adjusted for correlations within industry. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Appendix  Summary of Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
DA Abnormal accruals for a firm for a fiscal year, which is estimated using industry- 
specific modified Jones model with IPOs and SEOs deleted in the cross-sectional 
estimation of normal accruals. 
SI Subsidy income divided by net income for a firm over a fiscal year. 
TAXSAV (33%* pre-tax income - income tax expense + tax refund) / net income for a firm over 
a fiscal year. 
TFI Sum of subsidy rate (SI) and income tax savings rate (TAXSAV) for a firm over a fiscal 
year. 
MKT Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity for a firm at 
a fiscal year. 
LEV The sum of short- and long-term debt divided by total assets for a firm at a fiscal year. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets for a firm at a fiscal year. 
EXP The ratio of fixed assets to total assets for a firm at a fiscal year. 
ROA Operating return on assets for a firm over a fiscal year. 
∆ROA The absolute value of change in operating return on assets for a firm over a fiscal year. 
DistanceROE The absolute difference between pre-subsidy ROE and regulatory ROE threshold for a 
firm over a fiscal year.  
INDSUBSI Industry median of pre-subsidy return on assets within a region for a fiscal year, 
deflated by total assets for a firm at the fiscal year. 
GDP Annual territorial GDP for the province in which a firm is headquartered, divided by 
annual national GDP. 
 
